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1 Introduction: can SSR fit all African
environments?
In recent years, anglophone countries have
arguably been more open to changes towards
increased accountability of their security forces
(ministries of defence relatively independent
from the armed forces; parliamentarian
oversight; accountability to audit bodies,
ombudsmen, human rights commissions, etc.)
than their francophone equivalents. Partly this
may reflect variations in their respective
democratic transition processes. But another
factor has been the active promotion of security
sector reform (SSR) itself in countries like
Sierra Leone, Ghana, etc., together with some
cross-fertilisation among anglophone countries,
as well as the demonstration effects of the South
African model. The situation is of course far
from ideal: in many countries, security
ministries still tend to be weak and badly
resourced; the mechanisms of ‘horizontal’
accountability – to audit bodies, ombudsmen,
human rights commissions, etc. – are weak in
essence, and military forces have fared better
than the police forces. But it cannot be denied
that security governance has been improving in
an important number of anglophone countries
over the last few years. 
Francophone African countries are usually
presented as not having experienced any
significant transformation in security governance.
The recent seizure of power by the military – or
with their complicity – in several states is seen as
dramatic evidence of the total lack of
improvement in security governance. However,
the situation is much more complex. It is also
important to be aware that an important number
of countries, including non-democratic ones, have
tiptoed into a process of reform. Most of the time,
those reform processes have been undertaken
and framed without the SSR label. But they are
in fact resulting in more professional and
accountable security forces, which is the
overarching purpose of the SSR approach. 
Identifying better ways to harmonise the SSR
programmes being implemented all over the
African continent requires a deep understanding
of the similarities and differences which exist
between African countries that belong to different
linguistic areas and inherited from colonial rule.
The issue at stake is neither to provide a
performance rating of francophone and
anglophone security apparatus nor to define
performance benchmarks against which security
apparatuses should be systematically assessed.
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This article aims to provide a better understanding
of the institutional, organisational, bureaucratic
and legal security arrangements operating in
Francophone and Anglophone African countries, to
highlight their commonalities and differences and
to provide an overview of the actors, structures,
and how security systems function. Former French
territories (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad,
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Central Africa, Gabon,
Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo)1 and
former British and American colonies (Botswana,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa,
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and
Zimbabwe) are reviewed in this article. 
2 Institutional patterns
All francophone countries have centralised
presidential systems, in which security
bureaucracies report directly or indirectly to the
President. Although anglophone countries
initially had an inherited tradition of
parliamentary government, in reality presidential
control has also prevailed in all of them. In the
two sets of countries, the prominence of the
executive branch has downsized the role of the
parliaments, although this is still formally
recognised by the constitutions. 
2.1 The central role of the President
In Francophone Africa, the legacy of colonialism
and then the adoption of constitutions inspired
by – if not carbon-copied from – the French Fifth
Republic Constitution have resulted in the
concentration of power in the executive branch.
A constant feature of most francophone
Constitutions is the President of the Republic
presiding over all security apparatuses, whilst
the government – mostly through the ministries
of defence, interior/internal security and justice
– is responsible for implementing security
policies. The President also has the power to
appoint civilian and military positions (for
instance the Chief of General Staff of the armed
forces, as well as other heads of the civilian and
military administration). The President can also
hold ‘exceptional powers’ and has the power to
declare a state of emergency, though this can
only be after consultation with his Council of
Ministers. Furthermore it is important to note
that most of the Francophone African
constitutions have also integrated provisions
inspired by the American Constitution: they
appoint the President as the ‘supreme
commander in chief of the armed forces’, the
adjective ‘supreme’ being directly taken from the
American Constitution.
Initially, institutional arrangements in most
anglophone countries reflected the distinctively
British heritage, for example parliamentary
government, common law, sharp separation in
principle between external defence and internal
policing, hence between military and police, etc.
However, most anglophone countries have shifted
toward presidential governance, not least in
relation to the security sector – hence tending to
converge with French-speaking countries.
Currently, nearly all the constitutions in former
British colonies (with the exception of Ethiopia,
Lesotho and Swaziland), provide for the
presidential system of government, as opposed to
the Westminster parliamentary system inherited
at independence. Furthermore, in Anglophone
Africa, security governance influences stem from
models other than the United Kingdom
institutional tradition – either from widespread
links with other Commonwealth countries or
from the USA – for example, in Nigeria where
the federal constitution, presidential government,
the bicameral legislature and its select
committees etc., reflect the US influence even
more than the British. The US influence is also
paramount in Liberia. As in Francophone Africa,
it is worth noting that constitutional provisions
inspired by the US Presidentialist Constitution
have been integrated in a number of other
anglophone countries, especially the provision
entitling the President of the Republic as
Supreme Chief of the armed forces. The
constitutions stipulate that the President has
ultimate powers to determine the operational use
of all security forces. The President also appoints
the ministers in charge of the ministries of
defence, home/internal affairs and intelligence.
The President also has the executive power to
appoint the operational commanders of the
security forces such as the Defence Chief of Staff
as well as the Inspector General (in some
countries called commissioner) of Police, and the
Inspector General of Intelligence. 
2.2 Role of the parliaments
In both Anglophone and Francophone Africa,
parliamentary oversight of the security services is
provided for in most constitutions. Since the 1990s,
the francophone constitutions have established a
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system of separation and collaboration between
the executive and the legislative branches. Most of
them state that the parliament is in charge of
declaring war and of ratifying peace agreements.
Moreover, as in France, the constitutions of
Francophone African states recognise that ‘the
fundamental principles of the general organisation
of the national defence’ result from the legal
domain, which means that their defence policies
are passed into law by the legislature, though only
after being reviewed by the appropriate
committee. Furthermore, the national assembly
may call on the security forces to defend national
territory, or to approve or amend any act relating
to new alliances. Most of the time, it has to
approve any engagement of its armed forces
abroad. In countries such as Benin and Niger, the
parliament is entitled to adopt bills that ratify any
international alliance: this includes military
assistance agreements. Generally, the national
assembly has the power to monitor the actions of
the government through consideration of the
budget (including a facility to approve the funds
that are to be allocated to various security
structures, to revise it downwards or upwards or to
redirect budget allocations toward other areas);
questions to the government; and parliamentary
standing committees (on national defence,
security, justice and civil protection). Like all other
standing committees, these committees have a
duty to monitor the actions of the government;
they may hold audiences with ministers, and call
before them anyone who needs to be consulted.
The committees receive draft bills from the
government but, in some countries such as Benin
and Mali, they may also propose laws on security
issues. These committees are, however, mainly in
charge of carrying out surveys and drafting
amendments. They are not investigative bodies,
nor are they units that provide direct control of the
activities of the security sector, even if they are
allowed to call on external expertise. 
In anglophone countries under presidential
constitutions, the parliament is empowered to
make laws to regulate the President’s
constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief of
the security services. As in Francophone Africa,
parliaments are empowered to form select
committees on particular security services for
the purpose of oversight. Apart from Lesotho
and Malawi, all national parliaments in
Anglophone Africa have select committees
responsible for monitoring the security sector. In
larger parliaments, like Nigeria’s and South
Africa’s, the parliament has separate committees
on defence (in addition to defence, the Senate in
Nigeria has a committee for the army, air force
and navy), police and intelligence. In smaller
parliaments, such as that of Zambia and Ghana,
defence and the interior are combined under one
committee. There are also committees on
appropriation and public accounts, which are
meant to debate, approve and review defence,
internal security and intelligence budgets. In
addition, the committees have powers to conduct
investigations into security matters, and to
review the management of security by the
executive branch as the need arises. This
includes the power to summon the President,
ministers or heads of the security services to the
parliament to defend their actions.
The role of parliaments, as acknowledged by the
constitutions, is therefore very similar in
Francophone and Anglophone Africa. However,
in the two sets of countries, the constitutional
provisions related to parliamentarian oversight
have more than often been ignored in practice. 
3 Decision-making structures 
An important difference between Anglophone
and Francophone Africa is the existence of
collegial organs meant to be fully associated in
the decision-making process.
3.1 NSC and High Councils on National Defence
In almost all anglophone countries, the
appointments and decisions are supposedly made
on the advice of collegial organs which are
established to advise the President on policy
matters relating to security and consequently
have an important role in the policy decision-
making process. The Cabinet is the highest
decision-making organ of government, and this
includes national security policy. Moreover, in the
last ten years, structures and policy review
processes, such as Defence Reviews and/or
National Security Reviews and White Papers,
have been introduced and interagency decision-
making structures have been set up. At the top of
all national security organs is the National
Security Council (NSC), which coordinates all
security policy and advises the President on
national security matters. The NSC, which is
under the direct control of the presidency, is
managed by a National Security Adviser (as in
Nigeria) or a National Security Coordinator (as
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in Ghana and Sierra Leone). NSC meetings are
presided over by the President and are made up
of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence,
Interior, and Finance, and other ministers such
as the President determines. Other members of
the NSC are the Chief of Defence Staff (or
alternatively Force Commander), the Inspector
General of Police and the directors of the various
intelligence agencies. The influence of those
NSCs of course varies from case to case. 
Two other important national organs that can be
found in many anglophone countries are the
Defence Council and the Police Council. Known
as the Armed Forces Council in some countries
(for example in Ghana and the Gambia), the
Defence Council is principally responsible for
advising the President on defence policy and acts
as a mechanism for executive control and
supervision of the defence forces. It is usually
chaired by the President and includes the
Ministers of Foreign Defence, Foreign Affairs,
and the Interior, the Chief of Defence Staff, as
well as the service chiefs; the President may
appoint other members. The Defence Council is
only advisory and, in practice, Presidents do
make defence-related decisions without recourse
to it, particularly in countries with weaker
democratic credentials. The Police Council is
principally responsible for advising the President
on internal public security and safety policy. In
some countries the Police Council is chaired by
the Vice-President (as in Ghana), and others, the
President (Nigeria), while other members
include the Minister of the Interior, the
Inspector General of Police/Police Commissioner
and the Attorney General. 
In Francophone Africa, beyond the Council of
Ministers (under the authority of the Prime
Minister) which is in theory the first level of
coordination, there are no integrated processes
combining external defence, internal security,
policing, etc. within a single policy frame,
coordinated at the national level that can be seen
as comparable to the NSC. In most countries
however, the constitution sets up High Councils
on National Defence which are in fact rather
similar to the Defence Councils that can be
found in Anglophone Africa, including with
regard to their lack of real influence. The High
Councils of Defence, once again modelled on
their French counterparts, are chaired by the
President of the Republic and bring together all
ministers involved in security and defence
matters. Even if supposedly meant to think about
strategic orientations of the defence and security
policy, these structures are only focused on
defence and military policy. These Councils on
National Defence only have an advisory role.
They are on no account a decision-making body:
most of the time, these structures are a hollow
and empty shell. Most francophone countries do
not have any coordination structure to deal with
internal security matters. An interesting
exception is Burkina Faso where a coordinating
unit for internal security forces was implemented
in 2001 (police, gendarmerie and fire brigade). 
3.2 Organisation of the Defence Ministry
An important difference between Francophone
and Anglophone Africa is related to the division
within the ministries of defence themselves. In
almost all anglophone countries, the Ministry of
Defence (or Department of Defence) is organised
along British lines and Western tradition. The
operational commands of the forces usually work
together with a civilian bureaucracy of respective
ministries. At the head of the ministry is a
civilian minister appointed by the President. The
Ministry of Defence, which is responsible for the
development and implementation of national
defence policy, is made up of a defence secretariat
(defence bureaucracy) and a defence
headquarters, which are headed by the
(Permanent) Secretary/Minister of Defence and
the Chief of Defence Staff (known as Force
Commander in some countries), respectively. The
Secretary is the chief accounting officer for the
ministry and advises the Minister of Defence on
policy matters. The Chief of Defence Staff is
responsible for the operational command of the
armed forces and advises the minister on
operational matters related to national defence.
The ministry is therefore a crucial mechanism for
civil control and executive supervision of the
armed forces.
Such a clear distinction between civil and military
functions is far from widespread in francophone
ministries of defence: on the contrary, MOD are
most of the time administered by the military. 
4 Types of defence forces
A number of defence forces in Francophone
Africa (such as Presidential Guards and National
Guards) have no real counterpart in Anglophone
Africa. Furthermore, francophone defence forces
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are often officially endowed with development
missions, contrary to anglophone armed forces. 
4.1 The Republican/Presidential Guards
Presidential Guards are common in Francophone
African countries. Officially, the mission of the
Presidential Guard is to protect the Head of State
when he travels abroad or within the country, and
the presidential residences. The Presidential
Guards are usually drawn from the rank of the
military (officers and non-commissioned officers)
and the gendarmerie. However, the Presidential
Guards – called the republican guard in some
Francophone African countries which references
the French Republican Guard – are often
configured as praetorian bodies. These forces are
usually appointed on the basis of their loyalty
towards the President and recruited according to
ethnic criteria. The Presidential Guard is the
core security body in francophone non-democratic
countries. Even if they are formally integrated
into the armed forces’ chain of command, these
Presidential Guards are not accountable to the
Chief of Staff or to the Ministry of Defence: they
are accountable to virtually no one, except to the
President. 
Presidential Guards can also be found in less
authoritarian states. Even if their missions are
less challenging, they enjoy special status. The
Presidential Guards are one of the major
symptoms of the system of competing security
agencies and parallel chains of command which
characterise the military in Francophone Africa.
The Presidential/Republican Guards are
generally better equipped than the other armed
forces and they also enjoy virtual immunity for
the crimes and abuses they commit. In some
countries, the Presidential Guards have been
reformed however (in Niger for instance). 
In the past, a number of anglophone countries
sadly experienced Presidential Guards. In
Ghana, Nkrumah established the President’s
Own Guard Regiment in the 1960s. Jerry
Rawlings also had his own special protection
units. Many other anglophone countries have
established similar units, though these have
varied from country to country and period to
period. Today, formal Presidential/Republican
Guards are rare in Anglophone African
countries. However, in practice, a few countries
have specialised brigades within the army, known
as the Brigade of Guards, which provides
protection for the President. Arguably
francophone countries differ mainly in that
Presidential Guards have been a more uniform
and more institutionalised force. 
4.2 The National Guards 
In Mali and Mauritania, the National Guard
carries out important duties both military and
civilian in essence. It contributes to maintaining
order and public safety as well as to the general
policing of territorial communities. It is
entrusted with providing security to political and
administrative institutions and is also involved in
the prison services. What is specific about the
National Guard is that it has the ability to grow
into a formidable fighting force, capable of
serving alongside the army. The National Guard
is managed by the Minister of Defence but in
terms of operations is under the authority of the
Minister of the Interior. Generally, a Chief of
General Staff heads, coordinates and controls
the activities and duties of the division
commanders and the heads of units (who
command the territorial units in the provinces).
The National Guard is present all over the
national territory and works essentially to the
benefit of the administration and the population.
It is a highly decentralised force and it traces the
administrative division of the country. National
Guards are particularly worth considering
because they were reformed during the 1990s in
order to integrate members of former rebel
movements from the Sahelian region.
Deploying National Guards is not a common
practice in Anglophone Africa. Nigeria under
military rule experimented with the idea of a
National Guard in the late 1980s and early
1990s, but this was quickly abandoned.
4.3 Development missions for the armed forces
Traditionally most francophone countries have a
role envisioned for their armies in both economic
development and in education. In a number of
countries, the constitutions state that the armed
forces may participate in the economic, social
and cultural development of the country. Even if
those missions are not explicitly mentioned in
the constitutions themselves, missions that
involve the military in development or
humanitarian projects are often considered as a
possible (and legitimate) role for the armed
forces. Because of its resources, the military is
often seen as the only competent organisation
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able to perform a wide range of developmental
tasks in more remote areas. The use of the
armed forces is also seen as a way of creating a
combination of interests between the population
and the military. The armies of Mali, Senegal
and Benin have been particularly active in this
area (training the public in basic hygiene and
sanitation; implementing inoculation and
vaccination campaigns; building or repairing
schools and/or roads; and providing air transport
facilities to remote areas). 
In anglophone countries, only specific units of
the armed forces, namely the engineering corps
(and in some cases the health service), are
involved in development missions. 
5 Police forces
It is worth noting that both in Francophone and
Anglophone African countries, the operational
capabilities of the police forces have been
deliberately undermined by political rulers. In
most African countries, police forces have been
treated as inferior to the military both in status
and resources. Under-resourcing has resulted in
the inability of the police to grapple with public
insecurities arising from high crime rates and
serious internal security threats (Anderson and
Killingray 1992). The consequent loss of public
confidence in the police has led to the de-
legitimisation of the public police and recourse
to the military (resulting in a blurring of internal
and external security functions) and/or to
privatised sources of security and protection such
as corporate security companies and vigilantes. 
Consequently, reforming and enhancing the
operational capabilities of the police forces are
top priorities in both Francophone and
Anglophone countries. However, it is paramount
to address the reforms taking into account the
very different organisational frameworks of
policing in Francophone and Anglophone Africa.
Indeed, one of the defining differences between
francophone and anglophone states rests in large
part on the kind of security forces that are
responsible for the maintenance of internal order. 
5.1 Police forces in Francophone Africa
In most Francophone African countries that used
to be under French colonial rule, the policing
system is modelled on the French system. Two
different services are nationally involved in the
protection of internal order: the police forces on
the one hand and the gendarmerie forces on the
other. The relevance of the latter has been
questioned over the last few years. In addition, in
some countries, municipal police forces operate
alongside these two forces and are under the
mayor’s supervision.
5.1.1 Organisational, territorial and functional divisions
between police forces at the national level
To understand the way in which policing
functions in Francophone African countries, it is
necessary to make a three-fold distinction:
organisational, territorial and functional. 
The first division between the police forces and
the gendarmerie forces is organic/organisational in
essence. The National Police, headed by the
General Directorate of the National Police
(Direction Generale de la Police Nationale – DGPN),
come under the responsibility of the minister in
charge of security (in some cases also called the
Minister of the Interior). In most cases, the
General Directorate of National Police is divided
into the following departments (Kurian 2006): the
department of public security, in charge of
maintaining public order and controlling common
offences (assaults, rape, theft, fraud, mugging,
etc.); the criminal investigation department
(judiciary police), which investigates and
prosecutes major and organised crime; the
territorial surveillance department, which issues
permission to enter or exit the national territory
(counterpart of the so-called ‘police aux frontieres’ in
France); and the intelligence department,
responsible for administrative inquiries and
individual surveillance. Each department is
divided into several more general departments,
regional departments, provincial departments,
country desks, and services. In the various regions,
departments are placed under the administrative
authority of the regional governor, and under the
technical authority of the director general. This
dual layer of hierarchical and technical authority
enables regional governors to carry out their roles
as both regional civil services, and chiefs of
security in their area of expertise. 
On the other hand, the gendarmerie can be defined
as a civilian police force with military status. The
national gendarmerie is part of the military forces,
and comes under the jurisdiction of a general
directorate of the Ministry of Defence, which is
responsible for budget, recruitment, education,
training, equipment, administration and logistics
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of the gendarmerie forces. However, in operational
matters, the gendarmerie has to respond to the
agency that requires and asks for its services,
namely the Ministry of Interior on the one hand
and the Ministry of Justice on the other. The
gendarmerie is made up of two sub-divisions, the so-
called Great Commands (grands commandements):
the territorial gendarmerie (gendarmerie territoriale)
and the mobile gendarmerie (gendarmerie mobile). The
territorial gendarmerie is the cornerstone of the
gendarmerie and is responsible for national territory
surveillance, gathering intelligence, and the
execution of judiciary, military and administrative
police missions. The mobile gendarmerie is
specifically responsible for law enforcement all
over the national territory, and for the protection
of the authorities. It has absolutely no judiciary
police missions and its members are therefore not
judiciary police officers. 
The second division relates to the territorial
sharing of responsibilities between the National
Police and the gendarmerie forces. Police units
usually carry out their duties in urban areas and
cities, whereas the gendarmerie intervenes in rural
areas, and at borders (sometimes along with
forest security and customs units).
Thirdly, there is a legal/functional division
between the functions of the administrative and
judiciary police, although this distinction is not
always apparent, since police personnel can act
in both functions. Indeed these two functions are
exercised by both the National Police and the
gendarmerie. Members of the two police
organisations have, therefore, the status of both
administrative and judiciary police. The
administrative police are characterised as being,
essentially, for preventive purposes, responsible
for the protection of persons and property, and
for law enforcement. Both the National Police
and the national gendarmerie are in charge of
responsibilities such as maintaining order,
controlling and preventing crime, enforcing
public peace, looking after public health, and
regulating traffic. With particular regard to
maintaining law and order, special units of the
National Police (generally called ‘Compagnie
Républicaine de Sécurité’ (CRS)) and the
gendarmerie mobile (including, in most sensitive
situations, the so-called ‘Groupement d’Intervention
de la Gendarmerie Nationale’ (GIGN)) are
mobilised. It is also important to note that with
regard to law and order enforcement, there is a
hierarchy between the different forces: the
National Police are the first class of force who
can maintain public order. The gendarmerie
becomes involved as the second category force.
Under exceptional circumstances (e.g. in a state
of emergency), the armed forces may be called in
as a third category force to back up the police
and gendarmerie forces. 
The judiciary police could be described as
repressive; it is responsible for the detection and
investigation of crime, and the arrest of suspects.
The judiciary police units of the gendarmerie and the
National Police are specifically trained to be
responsible for discovering crimes, gathering
evidence, and seeking out offenders. In both
organisations the judiciary police are answerable
to the Minister of Justice. When they act as
judiciary police, the police and the gendarmerie
forces come under the authority of the courts,
particularly the juge d’instruction (examining
magistrate) and the procureur (prosecutor).
Furthermore, it is important to stress the fact that,
in addition to their judiciary and law-enforcement
duties, gendarmerie forces also have a military
defence function (military police, gathering
intelligence, protecting sensitive sites) and
perform several more directly combat-related
tasks in the event of war. Finally, both National
Police and gendarmerie forces are increasingly taking
part in international peacekeeping missions.
5.1.2 Are the gendarmerie forces an anachronism?2
To a number of observers, the gendarmerie forces
are seen as something of an anachronism, or
anomaly, since they represent the continuation of
a military presence in domestic security, and
therefore legitimise the involvement of the
armed forces in internal security matters. The
existence of the gendarmerie has been accused of
being a violation of the basic principle of the
liberal-democratic state with the distinction
between the police and the military. Due to their
militarised status, the gendarmerie is sometimes
associated with authoritarianism and repression
tendencies. One of the core problems that are
common to a number of Francophone African
countries is the insufficient separation and
blurred responsibilities between the police and
the military forces. Militarised police forces such
as the gendarmerie are consequently seen as
making this tendency worse. Moreover, the
difference that is defined between the police and
the gendarmerie lies in their jurisdiction: cities as
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the police forces’ jurisdictions versus the
countryside as the gendarmerie forces’ jurisdiction.
Yet, in many francophone countries, this
distinction is no longer respected. 
Nevertheless, despite such critiques, the
gendarmerie is often considered an elite corps: that
is why its recruitment may be more stringent
than for other services, such as the army or the
National Police forces. Gendarmes generally enjoy a
better reputation than the other security forces:
they appear to be a disciplined corps respectful of
hierarchy. The gendarmerie has generally
experienced fewer mutinies than other security
forces. More often than not they have not been
involved in any forcible takeovers of power.
However, the gendarmeries have been viewed as a
central unit that protects the regime, and has
sometimes been used as a tool of repression
against opposition movements. In other
countries, they are seen as a rival to the army. 
A number of francophone countries have
suppressed their gendarmerie forces, as with
Belgium in Europe, or Burundi and the
Democratic Republic of Congo in Africa. There
is currently a debate in France, where a number
of voices have been pleading for the suppression
of the gendarmerie, in the context of budgetary
restrictions that makes the dual police system
unaffordable. Conversely, Switzerland decided to
create a gendarmerie-type force in early 2000. 
In contrast, it seems to a number of specialists
that the intermediary, gendarmerie-type of security
force is growing in significance (Lutterbeck 2004).
According to them, the emergence of a growing
number of transnational risks and threats that
increasingly challenge the traditional distinction
between internal and external security make the
case for more agencies that are located between
levels of internal and external security. The
distinction between external security on the one
hand – identified with mainly military threats
coming from the aggressive behaviour of other
states; and, on the other hand, internal security –
identified as criminal, or otherwise disturbing
activities, within the boundaries of a state, are
being increasingly blurred. This implies that both
crime and war have tended to meet and,
consequently, the role of the military and the
police forces have increasingly coincided. In a
number of aspects, such as with formal affiliation,
internal structures and armoury, the gendarmeries
occupy an intermediary position between internal
and external security forces. The gendarmerie forces
are organised along military lines and are thus
more centralised and hierarchical than the
civilian police forces. They are also equipped with
heavier equipment than common police forces
(armoured cars, light infantry weapons). Finally,
as mentioned above, the gendarmeries have a double
affiliation with the Ministry of Defence and the
Ministry of Interior and carry out their judiciary
police missions under the supervision of the
Ministry of Justice. 
Due to the fact that they combine both the
characteristics of police and military forces, the
gendarmeries are seen by some observers as
particularly appropriate institutions to deal with
challenges that emerge in Africa. They are seen
as a relevant force that can easily be mobilised to
deal with:
z border control to respond to various
transnational challenges (fighting arms and
drug trafficking). Gendarmerie forces are
increasingly mobilised for border enforcement,
sometimes along with the armed forces; 
z peace operations, especially in the attempts at
post-war reconstruction. African crises are
often characterised by the gravity of the
offences and crimes that have been
committed, mostly against civilians, by
troublemakers. Due to their double affiliation,
gendarmerie forces can be deployed both under
civilian (for law enforcement as well as
judiciary missions) and under military
command (their military skills enabling them
to engage in fighting missions in cases of the
deterioration of situations from post-conflict
to war). It has also been suggested that the
gendarmerie forces could act as judiciary
auxiliaries to the International Penal Court. 
Such views have inspired a new project: the
Organisation des Gendarmeries Africaines (African
Gendarmeries Organisation, OGA). A
Convention setting up the OGA was signed and
adopted by a number of Francophone African
countries which belong to three different areas
in Francophone Africa: North (Maghreb, Mali
and Niger); Western African countries (Senegal,
Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Guinea); and Eastern and Central Africa (Chad,
RCA, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Djibouti and
Madagascar). Senegal hosts the Secretariat of
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the OGA. On 20 June 2006, the French Minister
of Interior officially announced that France was
willing to support the setting up of an African
gendarmerie force, similar to the European
gendarmerie force, which was launched within the
framework of the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) (Franceschi 2006, 2007). 
Beyond Francophone Africa, the debate around
the relevance of civilian police forces with military
status may be of interest for Anglophone Africa. 
5.1.3 The municipal police
The municipal police are generally controlled by
the Ministry of Territorial Administration.
Supervising municipal police services is one of
the responsibilities of the municipalities. The
municipal police, therefore, come under the
authority of a mayor, and operate under a
municipal police commandant. They are a police
of proximity. Their attributions are to: 
z ensure the safety and the convenience of
public activities on streets, public highways,
and other public facilities – notably cleaning,
lighting, the removal of congestion, the
demolition or repair of unsafe buildings;
repress infringements on public order (fights,
crowds, noise and night-gatherings); 
z maintain order during large gatherings;
inspect the accuracy of measures of foodstuff
sold by weight or by measure and the
healthiness of edible food on sale; 
z ensure the protection of persons and of public
and private goods; 
z and guarantee the preservation of public
places like waterways, forests, hunting and
fishing services. 
Municipal policemen have an obligation to
report all occurrences falling under the
jurisdiction of the National Police, and to give
assistance to repress breaches of the peace,
morality and neatness of the city. 
In some francophone countries, municipal police
forces operate alongside National Police forces
based in towns. However, in many countries,
municipal police forces only exist in theory.
5.2 Organisation of the police forces in Anglophone
Africa 
In Anglophone Africa, all the police forces are
nationally controlled, i.e. they have a central
command at the national level (Hills 2000, 2007).
Most police forces are therefore territorially
organised into national headquarters, provincial,
divisional and district commands. However, the
different specialised functions of policing also
determine the organisation of the police. While
the regular police enforce the law and work to
prevent, detect and fight crime, paramilitary
police concentrate on the preservation of public
order. The paramilitary police, commonly known
as Police Mobile Unit or Police Mobile Force, are
present in many countries, including Botswana,
Malawi, Nigeria (the Police Mobile Force ),
Mauritius, Malawi and Lesotho. Paramilitary
police forces are known as the General Service
Units in Kenya, the Police Intervention Unit in
the Gambia, and the Rapid Response Unit in
Uganda: personnel of these specialised police are
drafted from the regular police and given special
training. These mobile units can be compared to
the CRS of the police forces and to the mobile
units of the gendarmerie in francophone countries.
In some cases, paramilitary police are deployed
together with the military in internal operations
during periods of disorder. In some countries,
paramilitary police forces have access to hard
military weapons, including helicopters, gunships
and armoured personnel carriers. Paramilitary
policing has therefore been the hallmark of
policing in Anglophone Africa, particularly when
it comes to dealing with serious internal crises.
There are no counterparts to the municipal police
forces that can be found in a number of
francophone countries. However, the practice of
‘proximity policing’ developed by the francophone
municipal police may be interestingly compared
to the practice of ‘community policing’ developed
by anglophone police forces. 
6 Training capacities 
In Francophone Africa, of special interest is the
concept of ENVR (Ecoles Nationales a Vocation
Regionale – National Schools with Regional
Vocation). The ENVR’s aim is to adapt the
training that is traditionally taught in French
military schools to the particularities of the
African continent. The ENVRs are supported by
France and are meant to welcome trainees who
come from all francophone countries. 25–50 per
cent of the available positions are booked for
trainees who originate from the host nation.
Trainees have to pass an entrance examination
to have access to the schools. Some of these
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schools are called upon to work closely with
regional organisations, including the African
Union (AU) and, in the long run, to become
excellence training centres for the AU standby
brigades. Currently, there are 14 ENVRs in
Africa, located in 10 francophone countries:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo
in West Africa, and Cameroon and Gabon in
Central Africa. They offer 50 different types of
training, which generally relate to three major
areas: military general training; support of peace
operations; and specialised training. A number of
these training areas are bilingual
(French/English). The most recent ENVR is the
so-called EIFORCES (International Security
Forces Training School) in Awaé, Cameroon,
meant to train both police and gendarmerie forces
for peacekeeping-related missions. 
The ENVR works with the same principles as the
Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Centre in Accra and
the National War College in Abuja. 
7 State of the art research on SSR
An important amount of knowledge has been
accumulated on the security sector in
Anglophone Africa, thanks to the expertise and
research activities carried out by a lively network
of research centres such as the African Security
Sector Network, African Security Dialogue and
Research, the Centre for Democracy and
Development, the Southern African Defence and
Security Management Network, and the Centre
for Policy Research and Dialogue, based in
Eastern, Western and Southern Africa. 
In contrast, carrying out documentary research
into institutional security development in
Francophone Africa is a real challenge: there is
little information and few materials – either as
primary or secondary sources – available in the
public domain. Only a few states have compiled
the statutory rules of their civil service, and texts
relating to the special statutes that characterise
most of the defence and security forces in
Francophone African states are unavailable. As a
consequence, priority must be given to European
or North American research or documentation
centres when carrying out documentary research
into the security sector of an African
francophone country. In addition, there are no
organised SSR-focused research capabilities of
any importance that can be identified in
Francophone Africa. Individual academics –
rather than research centres, networks or think
tanks – are working on SSR topics in an isolated
way. It is important to note, however, that these
people, if not numerous, do generally have a very
deep knowledge of African francophone security
systems. Often, they belong to research centres
that are specialised in international relations,
strategic studies or geopolitics (see for instance
N’Diaye 2007; Agokla 2010; Sangaré 2006;
Toulabor 2005; Bryden et al. 2008). A lot of
francophone practitioners have also developed
specialised skills in the field of security reform. If
connected to a strong network, these academics
and practitioners could make invaluable
contributions to SSR in Francophone Africa. 
It is important to acknowledge that difficulties in
conducting research in most of Africa, and
particularly Francophone Africa, constitutes in
some cases a wilful obstacle to knowledge
production for analysis and sound policy
formulation: it is in itself a major hurdle to the
improvement of security provision and stability.
Furthermore, the ‘secrets’ that these practices are
supposed to protect are often common knowledge.
8 Conclusion
The time is ripe to share and build upon the
experience of both Francophone and Anglophone
(and Lusophone) Africa within shared policy
frameworks/concerns, either by extending the
theory and practice of SSR to francophone
countries, or through other less intrusive forms
of experience-sharing. Yet institutional
variations matter and have to be understood and
built into policy and practice on SSR. The
general principles of SSR are no doubt relevant
to Francophone Africa as well. However, for SSR
programmes to be efficient in Francophone
Africa there is a need to recognise that, beyond
sharing a common language, the majority of
Francophone African states share a specific
model from an institutional, organisational and
procedural standpoint. Today, the major
international actors involved in SSR acknowledge
that the peculiarities of French-speaking African
environments have not been sufficiently taken
into account in the original conceptualisation of
SSR as well as the implementation of policies on
the ground. A thorough knowledge of these
features is consequently necessary to ensure the
success of reforms in Francophone Africa, both in
post-conflict environments and conflict
prevention strategies. 
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Notes
1 Former Belgian colonies are not reviewed
here. 
2 This title refers to the analysis of Bayley
(1985) who viewed the persistence of the
gendarmerie as somewhat of an anachronism.
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